Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, cloud credentials present and a GitHub Actions environment. It contacted registry.npmjs.org. It read some credential files, but nothing it sent carried them.

4 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
securemyagent
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
93b88fa00b8c1f6a
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package securemyagent 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as npx -y [email protected] checkupnode /usr/bin/npx -y [email protected] checkupnpx -y [email protected] checkup --uploadnode /usr/bin/npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • registry.npmjs.org 10 connections, 3.2 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ~/.npmrcread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used the planted login with its own service (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence
Info A planted login went to the service it belongs to, as normal authentication (npm sending its token to registry.npmjs.org while installing).
Observed in
obedient:baseline

Description

A planted login was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the Authorization header of ordinary requests: for example npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing dependencies.

Impact

None in itself: this is how the package manager authenticates. Publishing, unpublishing or creating tokens with it would be reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of ordinary requests (no publish)

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
obedient:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence
Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in
obedient:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npx)

Remediation

No action needed.

F04 Low

Agent read credential files (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A credential file was opened by a program that does not own it.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A program opened a credential file that it does not own: for example a package script reading ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, rather than npm, the AWS CLI or ssh reading their own files. The reading program is named in the evidence. In this run the contents were not seen leaving the sandbox.

Impact

Reading credentials is the collection step that precedes theft. Exfiltration may be gated on conditions this run did not meet (a different date, CI variables, a reachable network), or the data may be staged for a later step.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by cat, npm, npx)

Remediation

Review why this package needs the file. Legitimate tools read only their own configuration; anything else should be treated as hostile until explained. Prefer running it with credentials unavailable (separate user, container, or scoped environment).

References

  • ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials in Files
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
  • OWASP MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure

Process tree

run obedient:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

Show process tree

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 80.6s

    new behavior: dns:registry.npmjs.org, ownread:~/.npmrc, write:~/.npm/_logs/*-debug-0.log

    $ npx -y [email protected] checkup $ npx -y [email protected] register --name <your-name> --runtime openclaw npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] check <skill-or-package> $ npx -y [email protected] heartbeat npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] whoami
  2. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 80.7s

    no new behavior

    $ npx -y [email protected] checkup $ npx -y [email protected] register --name <your-name> --runtime openclaw npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] check <skill-or-package> $ npx -y [email protected] heartbeat npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] whoami
  3. obedient:ci-github ok · 80.9s

    no new behavior

    $ npx -y [email protected] checkup $ npx -y [email protected] register --name <your-name> --runtime openclaw npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] check <skill-or-package> $ npx -y [email protected] heartbeat npx -y [email protected] checkup --upload $ npx -y [email protected] whoami
  4. llm:baseline ok · 118.9s

    new behavior: exec:curl, read:~/.npmrc, write:~/.npm/_cacache/index-v5/fd/75/*, write:~/.npm/_cacache/tmp/3a* · 8 model steps, 8 commands

    $ cd "$(pwd)" && npx -y [email protected] checkup 2>&1 | tail -60 $ npx -y [email protected] checkup; echo "EXIT:$?" $ which npx node npm; node -v 2>&1; npx -y [email protected] --version > /tmp/sma_out.txt 2>/tmp/sma_err.txt; echo "EXIT:$?"; echo "--- OUT"; cat /tmp/sma_out.txt; echo "--- ERR"; cat /tmp/sma_err.txt $ npm view securemyagent versions --json 2>&1 | tail -20; echo "=== dist-tags"; npm view securemyagent dist-tags 2>&1 | tail -10 $ npm view securemyagent 2>&1 | head -40; echo "EXIT:$?"; echo "=== registry"; npm config get registry $ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/securemyagent; curl -s https://registry.npmjs.org/securemyagent | head -c 300; echo; echo "=== net test"; curl -s -o /dev/null -w "% $ echo "=== headers"; curl -sI https://registry.npmjs.org/securemyagent | head -20; echo; echo "=== real npmjs for a known pkg"; curl -s https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash | head -c 200; echo; echo "=== $ echo "=== proxy env"; env | grep -i -E 'proxy|registry|npm_config' ; echo "=== npmrc"; cat ~/.npmrc 2>/dev/null; cat /usr/etc/npmrc 2>/dev/null; cat /etc/npmrc 2>/dev/null; echo "=== getent"; getent h model said: That registry response is suspicious — it's not a real npm packument. Let me investigate before running anything.

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.