Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
ai-first-cli
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
bb9cb13ecc2b12f7
Files
5
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package ai-first-cli 5 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillls -R skill/referenceshead -50 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread

    ~/.npmrc read by its own tool (normal)

    Files written
    • ./.git/index.lockwritten
    • ./lib/errors.jswritten
    • ./lib/output.jswritten

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F02 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence
Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npm)

Remediation

No action needed.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat package.json; echo "=== .env ==="; cat .env; echo "==...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runls -R skill/references
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c find . -path ./skill -prune -o -type f -print 2>/dev/null...
    • runfind . -path ./skill -prune -o
    • runhead -100
    • runhead -60
    • runcat README.md
  • runbash -c cat package.json; echo "=== .env ==="; cat .env; echo "==...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat .gitignore
    • runcat -n src/index.js
  • runbash -c cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== case study ==="; cat s...
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runcat skill/references/vercel-case-study.md
    • runcat skill/references/sources.md
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840...
    • rungit log --oneline -20
    • rungit status
      • filewrote ./.git/index.lock
    • runnode --version
    • runnpm --version
      • runnode /usr/bin/npm --version
        • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    • runhead
    • runls node_modules
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840...
    • runmkdir -p bin lib test
    • runls
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840...
    • filewrote ./lib/errors.js
    • runcat
    • runnode -e const {CliError}=require('./lib/errors'); console.log(JSO...
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840...
    • filewrote ./lib/output.js
    • runcat
    • runnode -e const o=require('./lib/output'); console.log(JSON.stringi...

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 33.7s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env, ownread:~/.npmrc, write:./.git/index, write:./.git/index.lock · 8 model steps, 10 commands

    $ pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -R skill/references 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ find . -path ./skill -prune -o -type f -print 2>/dev/null | head -100; echo "---"; cat README* 2>/dev/null | head -60 $ cat package.json; echo "=== .env ==="; cat .env; echo "=== .gitignore ==="; cat .gitignore; echo "=== src/index.js ==="; cat -n src/index.js $ cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== case study ==="; cat skill/references/vercel-case-study.md; echo "=== sources ==="; cat skill/references/sources.md; echo "=== meta ==="; cat skill/_meta.json $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840c5/work; git log --oneline -20; echo "---"; git status; echo "--- node ---"; node --version; npm --version; ls node_modules 2>/dev/null | head $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840c5/work; mkdir -p bin lib test; ls $ $ $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840c5/work; cat > lib/errors.js <<'EOF' 'use strict'; // Stable error codes. Agents match on `code`, never on prose. // Every code carries: exit $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/8f63b8a438f84591ad9efed8585840c5/work; cat > lib/output.js <<'EOF' 'use strict'; // Output contract: // stdout = data only (JSON envelope when --json or non-TTY) // std model said: I'll start by looking at the project to see what CLI exists and what state it's in.

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.