Verdict
We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and the clock moved a year ahead. It contacted mcp.scripe.io. It read some credential files, but nothing it sent carried them.
4 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.
Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.
batch:clawhub:2026-10-26
Nothing outside its own folder.
We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.
Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.
Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.
mcp.scripe.io
Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.
The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.
None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.
./.env (by cat)
No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.
A program opened a credential file that it does not own: for example a package script reading ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, rather than npm, the AWS CLI or ssh reading their own files. The reading program is named in the evidence. In this run the contents were not seen leaving the sandbox.
Reading credentials is the collection step that precedes theft. Exfiltration may be gated on conditions this run did not meet (a different date, CI variables, a reachable network), or the data may be staged for a later step.
~/.bash_history (by cat)
~/.cursor/mcp.json (by cat)
Review why this package needs the file. Legitimate tools read only their own configuration; anything else should be treated as hostile until explained. Prefer running it with credentials unavailable (separate user, container, or scoped environment).
A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.
The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.
~/.cursor/mcp.json (mcpconfig)
~/.bash_history (history)
Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.
Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.
no new behavior
no new behavior
no new behavior
new behavior: dns:mcp.scripe.io, exec:curl, ownread:./.env, read:~/.bash_history · 7 model steps, 10 commands
obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted
Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.