Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted clawhub.ai and www.gov.cn. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

3 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
bid-win-skill
Source
clawhub 1.0.1
SHA-256
7286c58f42e56924
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package bid-win-skill 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lafind . -maxdepth 3 -name SKILL.mdcat .envls -la skill src An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • clawhub.ai 4 connections, 412 B sent
    • www.gov.cn 2 connections, 184 B sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

clawhub.ai
www.gov.cn

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F03 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c cd /home/user 2>/dev/null; pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; find ...
    • runls -la
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -name SKILL.md
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runls -la skill src
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat .gitignore
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -5
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runls -la skill/references skill/Doc
    • runfind / -maxdepth 6 -type d
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runtimeout 15 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netclawhub.ai:443 sent 103 B
    • runtimeout 15 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netwww.gov.cn:443 sent 73 B
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sSL https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill
      • runcurl -sSL https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill
        • netclawhub.ai:443 sent 103 B
    • runsed -e s/<[^>]*>/ /g
    • runhead -c 3000
    • runtr -s \n \n
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runhead -c 1500
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sSL -H Accept: text/html
      • runcurl -sSL -H Accept: text/html https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill
        • netclawhub.ai:443 sent 109 B
    • runhead -c 800
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sSL https://clawhub.ai/api/skills/bid-win-skill
      • runcurl -sSL https://clawhub.ai/api/skills/bid-win-skill
        • netclawhub.ai:443 sent 97 B
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca1...
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sSL https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2021-10/29/content_5647633.htm
      • runcurl -sSL https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2021-10/29/content_5647633.htm
        • netwww.gov.cn:443 sent 111 B
        • netDNS lookups for clawhub.ai, gov.cn 12 queries
    • runsed -e s/<[^>]*>/ /g
    • runtr -s \n \n
    • rungrep -n 第四十一条\|第三十三条\|第五十一条
    • runhead -20

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 36.7s

    new behavior: dns:clawhub.ai, dns:www.gov.cn, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 8 model steps, 8 commands

    $ cd /home/user 2>/dev/null; pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; find . -maxdepth 3 -name "SKILL.md" 2>/dev/null $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; ls -la skill src; echo "--- README"; cat README.md; echo "--- package.json"; cat package.json; echo "--- .env"; cat .env; echo "--- gi $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; cat skill/_meta.json; echo "--- card"; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "--- src"; cat src/index.js; echo "--- git log"; git log --onelin $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; ls -la skill/references skill/Doc 2>&1; echo "---"; find / -maxdepth 6 -type d -name "references" -path "*bid*" 2>/dev/null; find / -m $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; timeout 15 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill 2>&1; timeout 15 curl -sS -o /d $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; timeout 20 curl -sSL https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>/ /g' | tr -s ' \n' ' \n' | head -c 3000 $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; timeout 20 curl -sSL -H "Accept: text/html" https://clawhub.ai/pandleeai/skills/bid-win-skill | head -c 1500; echo; echo "=== try api" $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/33696911d13a44e5b943798b369ca172/work; timeout 20 curl -sSL "https://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2021-10/29/content_5647633.htm" | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>/ /g' | tr -s ' \n' ' \n' | grep - model said: 我先查看一下这个 skill 的目录结构，了解它包含哪些内容。

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.