Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and cloud credentials present. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
taplio-linkedin-story-extractor
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
7e15fc84abd1d333
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package linkedin-story-extractor 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillcat .envcat skill/_meta.json An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/
    • runls -la src
    • runhead -50 src/index.js
  • runbash -c which claude; claude mcp list 2>&1 | head -20; env | grep...
    • runwhich claude
    • runhead -20
    • runenv
    • rungrep -i -E taplio|mcp
    • runsed s/=.*/=<set>/

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.8s

    no new behavior

    $ STORY ANGLE [one-line summary of why this story matters] LINKEDIN POST [hook : the most surprising fact of the story] [line 2] [Situation, 2 lines] [Tension, 3-4 lines, white space] [Turning point, 1
  2. obedient:ci-github ok · 0.9s

    no new behavior

    $ STORY ANGLE [one-line summary of why this story matters] LINKEDIN POST [hook : the most surprising fact of the story] [line 2] [Situation, 2 lines] [Tension, 3-4 lines, white space] [Turning point, 1
  3. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 0.9s

    no new behavior

    $ STORY ANGLE [one-line summary of why this story matters] LINKEDIN POST [hook : the most surprising fact of the story] [line 2] [Situation, 2 lines] [Tension, 3-4 lines, white space] [Turning point, 1
  4. llm:baseline ok · 8.2s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env · 4 model steps, 3 commands

    $ ls -la; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null $ cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo ---; cat README.md; echo ---; cat package.json; echo ---; cat .env | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/'; echo ---; ls -la src; head -50 src/* 2>/dev $ which claude; claude mcp list 2>&1 | head -20; env | grep -i -E 'taplio|mcp' | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/' model said: I can't run this skill right now: the Taplio MCP isn't connected in this environment. The skill's first step is a `get_me` call to Taplio, and no Taplio tools are available to me here (no MCP server is configured, and there's no Taplio credential in the project). Per the skill's rules, I have to stop rather than ask you for your story or produce a post without it. **To get set up:** 1. Start a

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.