Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, the environment variables it says it needs and a GitHub Actions environment. It contacted clawhub.ai, github.com and registry.npmjs.org. It read some credential files, but nothing it sent carried them.

4 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target: gtrk-food-recap
Source: clawhub 1.3.9
SHA-256: bb097a00e2956d0e
Files: 3

RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 4 runs

Package gtrk-food-recap 3 files · agent skill
Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
Runs as ls -lawhich gtrkcat README.md package.json .env .gitignorels -la src skill An AI agent also used it 1 time.
What it reached
Network
- clawhub.ai 1 connection, 103 B sent
- github.com 1 connection, 84 B sent
- registry.npmjs.org 5 connections, 1.7 KB sent
Credentials
- ./.envread
- ~/.bash_historyread
- ~/.npmrcread
Files written
Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used a planted key with the service it belongs to (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence: Info A planted key went to the service it belongs to, as its login (npm to its registry, an OpenAI key to api.openai.com).
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A planted key was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the login header of its requests: npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing, or an app calling api.openai.com with the OpenAI key from .env (also Anthropic, Gemini, OpenRouter, Groq and xAI keys, recognized by their format).

Impact

Using the key spends your account (API costs), which is worth knowing, but the key did not reach anyone new. The key anywhere else in the request (for example inside a prompt), to any other host, or used to publish to npm, is reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of requests to registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence: Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

clawhub.ai

github.com

registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence: Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

Agent read credential files (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence: Info A credential file was opened by a program that does not own it.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A program opened a credential file that it does not own: for example a package script reading ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, rather than npm, the AWS CLI or ssh reading their own files. The reading program is named in the evidence. In this run the contents were not seen leaving the sandbox.

Impact

Reading credentials is the collection step that precedes theft. Exfiltration may be gated on conditions this run did not meet (a different date, CI variables, a reachable network), or the data may be staged for a later step.

Evidence

~/.bash_history (by cat)

~/.npmrc (by cat, npm)

Remediation

Review why this package needs the file. Legitimate tools read only their own configuration; anything else should be treated as hostile until explained. Prefer running it with credentials unavailable (separate user, container, or scoped environment).

References

ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials in Files
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
OWASP MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

runbash -c cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; ls -la src sk...
- runcat README.md package.json .env .gitignore
  - secretread ./.env
runbash -c cat ~/.bash_history; ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/cod...
- runcat ~/.bash_history
  - secretread ~/.bash_history
- runcat ~/.npmrc
  - secretread ~/.npmrc

View full process tree

runbash -c pwd && ls -la
- runls -la
runbash -c which gtrk && gtrk --version 2>&1 | head -20
- runwhich gtrk
runbash -c cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; ls -la src sk...
- runcat README.md package.json .env .gitignore
  - secretread ./.env
- runls -la src skill
- runcat src/index.js
- runhead -50
runbash -c ls -la skill; cat skill/*.md 2>/dev/null | head -100; nod...
- runls -la skill
- runhead -100
- runcat skill/SKILL.md skill/skill-card.md
- runnode --version
- runnpm --version
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm --version
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json skill/skill-card.md; git log --oneli...
- runcat skill/_meta.json skill/skill-card.md
- rungit log --oneline
- runhead -20
- runls -la ~
- runls ~/.gitruck
runbash -c npm ls -g --depth=0 2>/dev/null; ls /usr/local/bin /usr/b...
- runnpm ls -g --depth=0
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm ls -g --depth=0
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 431 B
- runls /usr/local/bin /usr/bin
- rungrep -i gtrk
- runhead -20
- runfind / -name gtrk* -maxdepth 6
runbash -c cat ~/.bash_history; ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/cod...
- runcat ~/.bash_history
  - secretread ~/.bash_history
- runcat ~/.npmrc
  - secretread ~/.npmrc
- runls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config
runbash -c find / -iname "*.mp4" -o -iname "*.mov" -o -iname "*.mkv"...
- runfind / -iname *.mp4 -o -iname
- runhead -20
- rungrep -v proc
runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version 2>&1 ...
- runtail -5
- runtimeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version
  - runnpm view @gitruck/cli version
    - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @gitruck/cli version
      - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
      - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 397 B
runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version; echo...
- runtimeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version
  - runnpm view @gitruck/cli version
    - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @gitruck/cli version
      - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
      - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 397 B
runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli 2>&1; echo "e...
- runtimeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli
  - runnpm view @gitruck/cli
    - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @gitruck/cli
      - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
      - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 397 B
- runtimeout 20 curl -sS -m 10
  - runcurl -sS -m 10 https://registry.npmjs.org/@gitruck%2Fcli
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 95 B
- runhead -c 300
runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS -m 20 -o /dev/null -w "%{h...
- runtimeout 30 curl -sS -m 20
  - runcurl -sS -m 20 -o /dev/null
    - netgithub.com:443 sent 84 B
- runtimeout 30 curl -sS -m 20
  - runcurl -sS -m 20 -o /dev/null
    - netclawhub.ai:443 sent 103 B
    - netDNS lookups for clawhub.ai, github.com, npmjs.org 14 queries

Exploration log

4 runs

obedient:baseline ok · 0.7s

no new behavior

$ 判这一帧对美食短视频有没有「看点」，0-100： - 大分量怼脸：食物占画面主体且分量夸张（堆尖的饭、溢出碗沿的面、整条鱼） - 夸张数量与价格的实物：成排的锅/几十份摆盘/写着惊人价格的标牌 - 人山排队：门口长队、满座、等位人群 - 名场面动作：颠勺起火、切生鱼片、拉面甩水、铁板翻面 - 反差罕见：凌晨空店、后厨全景、老器物、店主的手低分：空镜过渡、无主体的墙面桌面、拍糊的中间帧、纯字幕帧 $ gtrk matrix describe --plan <工程>/split/broll-plan.json --highlight-rubric @<工程>/highlight-rubric.txt
obedient:declared-env ok · 0.8s

no new behavior

$ 判这一帧对美食短视频有没有「看点」，0-100： - 大分量怼脸：食物占画面主体且分量夸张（堆尖的饭、溢出碗沿的面、整条鱼） - 夸张数量与价格的实物：成排的锅/几十份摆盘/写着惊人价格的标牌 - 人山排队：门口长队、满座、等位人群 - 名场面动作：颠勺起火、切生鱼片、拉面甩水、铁板翻面 - 反差罕见：凌晨空店、后厨全景、老器物、店主的手低分：空镜过渡、无主体的墙面桌面、拍糊的中间帧、纯字幕帧 $ gtrk matrix describe --plan <工程>/split/broll-plan.json --highlight-rubric @<工程>/highlight-rubric.txt
obedient:ci-github ok · 0.7s

no new behavior

$ 判这一帧对美食短视频有没有「看点」，0-100： - 大分量怼脸：食物占画面主体且分量夸张（堆尖的饭、溢出碗沿的面、整条鱼） - 夸张数量与价格的实物：成排的锅/几十份摆盘/写着惊人价格的标牌 - 人山排队：门口长队、满座、等位人群 - 名场面动作：颠勺起火、切生鱼片、拉面甩水、铁板翻面 - 反差罕见：凌晨空店、后厨全景、老器物、店主的手低分：空镜过渡、无主体的墙面桌面、拍糊的中间帧、纯字幕帧 $ gtrk matrix describe --plan <工程>/split/broll-plan.json --highlight-rubric @<工程>/highlight-rubric.txt
llm:baseline ok · 83.4s

new behavior: dns:clawhub.ai, dns:github.com, dns:registry.npmjs.org, exec:curl · 8 model steps, 12 commands

$ pwd && ls -la $ which gtrk && gtrk --version 2>&1 | head -20 $ cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; ls -la src skill; cat src/* 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ ls -la skill; cat skill/*.md 2>/dev/null | head -100; node --version; npm --version $ cat skill/_meta.json skill/skill-card.md; git log --oneline | head -20; ls -la ~ ; ls ~/.gitruck 2>/dev/null $ npm ls -g --depth=0 2>/dev/null; ls /usr/local/bin /usr/bin 2>/dev/null | grep -i gtrk; find / -name "gtrk*" -maxdepth 6 -not -path "*/proc/*" 2>/dev/null | head -20 $ cat ~/.bash_history; ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config ~/.local 2>/dev/null; cat ~/.npmrc $ find / -iname "*.mp4" -o -iname "*.mov" -o -iname "*.mkv" -o -iname "*.srt" -o -iname "*.ass" 2>/dev/null | grep -v proc | head -20; echo "---"; find / -iname "*food*" -o -iname "*ramen*" -o -iname "* $ cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version 2>&1 | tail -5 $ cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view @gitruck/cli version; echo "exit=$?" model said: I'll start by looking at the project directory and checking what's available.

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.