Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
rental-property-sell-or-hold
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
21833ba486c8efb1
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package rental-property-sell-or-hold 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lafind . -maxdepth 3 -not -pathhead -100sed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written
    • ./.git/index.lockwritten

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by grep, sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cd . && git status --short && git log --all --oneline | h...
    • rungrep -rniE rent|condo|strata|property|mortgage|yield|cca --include=* -l .
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && find . -maxdepth 3 -not -...
    • runls -la
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -not -path
    • runhead -100
  • runbash -c cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md package.json .gitignore
    • runcat src/index.js
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md skill/_meta.json
    • rungit log --oneline
    • runhead -20
  • runbash -c cd . && git status --short && git log --all --oneline | h...
    • rungrep -rniE rent|condo|strata|property|mortgage|yield|cca --include=* -l .
      • secretread ./.env
    • rungit status --short
      • filewrote ./.git/index.lock
    • rungit log --all --oneline
    • runhead ×2
    • rungrep -v ^./.git/

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 10.7s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env, write:./.git/index, write:./.git/index.lock · 4 model steps, 3 commands

    $ cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && find . -maxdepth 3 -not -path './.git/*' -type f | head -100 $ cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--- src" && cat src/index.js && echo "--- skill card" && cat skill/skill-card.md skill/_meta.json && echo "--- env keys" && sed 's/=.*/=<redacted $ cd . && git status --short && git log --all --oneline | head && grep -rniE "rent|condo|strata|property|mortgage|yield|cca" --include=* -l . 2>/dev/null | grep -v '^./.git/' | head model said: I read the skill and checked the project. Here's where things stand. ## What I found The current directory is a **payments API** (`payments-api` v2.14.3: Express, Postgres, Stripe, a `/health` route, a `.env` with API keys). It contains **no rental-property data at all**: no purchase prices, rents, strata fees, property tax, mortgage balances, or investment figures. The only files that mention p

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.