Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It made no network connections. It read some credential files, but nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
buyer-delivery-qa
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
6504074a9e78bfab
Files
4
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package buyer-delivery-qa 4 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lafind . -maxdepth 3 -not -pathhead -100head -50 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    • ~/.bash_historyread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by grep, sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F02 Low

Agent read credential files (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A credential file was opened by a program that does not own it.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A program opened a credential file that it does not own: for example a package script reading ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, rather than npm, the AWS CLI or ssh reading their own files. The reading program is named in the evidence. In this run the contents were not seen leaving the sandbox.

Impact

Reading credentials is the collection step that precedes theft. Exfiltration may be gated on conditions this run did not meet (a different date, CI variables, a reachable network), or the data may be staged for a later step.

Evidence

~/.bash_history (by cat)

Remediation

Review why this package needs the file. Legitimate tools read only their own configuration; anything else should be treated as hostile until explained. Prefer running it with credentials unavailable (separate user, container, or scoped environment).

References

  • ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials in Files
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
  • OWASP MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "=== package.json"; cat package.json;...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c grep -rIl -iE 'gumroad|notion|listing|etsy|lemonsqueezy|p...
    • rungrep -rIl -iE gumroad|notion|listing|etsy|lemonsqueezy|payhip|product . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config ~/.aws 2>...
    • runcat ~/.bash_history
      • secretread ~/.bash_history
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; find . -maxdepth 3 -not -path '*/.git...
    • runls -la
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -not -path
    • runhead -100
  • runbash -c cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -50; echo "---"; ls...
    • runhead -50
    • runcat skill/SKILL.md
    • runls -la skill
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "=== package.json"; cat package.json;...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat .gitignore
    • runcat src/index.js
  • runbash -c cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== meta"; cat skill/_meta...
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/agents/openai.yaml
    • rungit log --oneline -20
  • runbash -c grep -rIl -iE 'gumroad|notion|listing|etsy|lemonsqueezy|p...
    • rungrep -rIl -iE gumroad|notion|listing|etsy|lemonsqueezy|payhip|product . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
    • runenv
    • rungrep -iE gumroad|notion|etsy|shop|market|token|key|api
    • runcut -d= -f1
    • runsort
    • runhead -30
    • runls -la ~
  • runbash -c ls -la / 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; find / -maxdepth 3 \( -...
    • runls -la /
    • runfind / -maxdepth 3 ( -iname
    • runhead -40
  • runbash -c ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config ~/.aws 2>...
    • runcat ~/.bash_history
      • secretread ~/.bash_history
    • runls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config
    • runsed -E s/(key|token|secret|password)=[^ ]*/\1=<redacted>/gi

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 15.2s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env, read:~/.bash_history · 5 model steps, 7 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; find . -maxdepth 3 -not -path '*/.git/*' -not -path '*/node_modules/*' | head -100 $ cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -50; echo "---"; ls -la skill $ cat README.md; echo "=== package.json"; cat package.json; echo "=== .env (keys only)"; sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env; echo "=== .gitignore"; cat .gitignore; echo "=== src/index.js"; cat src/index.js $ cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== meta"; cat skill/_meta.json; echo "=== agents"; cat skill/agents/openai.yaml; echo "=== git log"; git log --oneline -20 $ grep -rIl -iE 'gumroad|notion|listing|etsy|lemonsqueezy|payhip|product' . --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=node_modules 2>/dev/null; echo "--- env var names"; env | cut -d= -f1 | sort | grep -iE 'gumr $ ls -la / 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; find / -maxdepth 3 \( -iname '*listing*' -o -iname '*gumroad*' -o -iname '*notion*' -o -iname '*product*' \) -not -path '/proc/*' -not -path '/sys/*' -not -path '/usr $ ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config ~/.aws 2>/dev/null; echo "--- bash_history"; cat ~/.bash_history 2>/dev/null | sed -E 's/(key|token|secret|password)=[^ ]*/\1=<redacted>/gi' model said: I've completed the evidence gathering. Here's the audit result. ## Buyer Delivery QA — Audit Result **No listing was available to audit.** The requested verification could not be performed because the workspace contains no digital-product listing, buyer files, or marketplace access. ### Evidence gathered | Check | Result | |---|---| | Project contents | `payments-api` — an Express payments ser

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.