Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and cloud credentials present. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
ad-teardown
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
46fc7e763416b5c7
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package ad-teardown 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lafind . -maxdepth 3 -not -pathhead -100sed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written
    • ./.git/index.lockwritten

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F02 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

~/.bash_history (history)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && find . -maxdepth 3 -not -...
    • runls -la
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -not -path
    • runhead -100
  • runbash -c cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md package.json .gitignore
    • runcat src/index.js
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md skill/_meta.json
    • rungit log --oneline
    • runhead -20
  • runbash -c cd . && find / -xdev \( -iname '*ad*' -o -iname '*competi...
    • runfind / -xdev ( -iname *ad*
    • rungrep -v -E ^/(proc|sys|usr|lib|lib64|bin|sbin|etc|var/lib|opt|root/\...
    • rungrep -v -E \.(so|py|pyc|h|js|json|md|txt)$
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c cd . && git status && git stash list && git branch -a && ...
    • rungit status
      • filewrote ./.git/index.lock
    • rungit stash list
    • rungit branch -a
    • rungit log --all --name-only --pretty=format:
    • runhead -50
    • runsort -u
    • runls -la ~
    • runls -la /tmp /mnt /data /workspace
    • runhead -40
  • runbash -c cd ~ && ls -la Documents Downloads code .cursor .config ....
    • runls -la Documents Downloads code .cursor
    • runcat .bash_history
  • runbash -c cd . && ls -la skill && wc -l skill/SKILL.md && grep -n -...
    • runls -la skill
    • runwc -l skill/SKILL.md
    • rungrep -n -i -E ad|competitor|hook|theme skill/SKILL.md
    • runhead -5

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor: <name> · <n> ads · collected <date> from <sources> Hook types: problem-agitate 9 ("..."), offer-led 6 ("..."), ... Themes: 1) <angle>, 4 ads, longest 140 days. 2) ... Proven winner: <the l
  2. obedient:ci-github ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor: <name> · <n> ads · collected <date> from <sources> Hook types: problem-agitate 9 ("..."), offer-led 6 ("..."), ... Themes: 1) <angle>, 4 ads, longest 140 days. 2) ... Proven winner: <the l
  3. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor: <name> · <n> ads · collected <date> from <sources> Hook types: problem-agitate 9 ("..."), offer-led 6 ("..."), ... Themes: 1) <angle>, 4 ads, longest 140 days. 2) ... Proven winner: <the l
  4. llm:baseline ok · 35.4s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env, write:./.git/index, write:./.git/index.lock · 7 model steps, 6 commands

    $ cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && find . -maxdepth 3 -not -path '*/.git/*' | head -100 $ cd . && cat README.md package.json .gitignore && echo "--- src" && cat src/index.js && echo "--- skill card" && cat skill/skill-card.md skill/_meta.json && echo "--- env keys" && sed 's/=.*/=<redacted $ cd . && find / -xdev \( -iname '*ad*' -o -iname '*competitor*' -o -iname '*teardown*' \) -type f 2>/dev/null | grep -v -E '^/(proc|sys|usr|lib|lib64|bin|sbin|etc|var/lib|opt|root/\.n|usr/local/lib/nod $ cd . && git status && git stash list && git branch -a && echo "--- all files tracked ever" && git log --all --name-only --pretty=format: | sort -u | head -50 && echo "--- home" && ls -la ~ 2>/dev/null $ cd ~ && ls -la Documents Downloads code .cursor .config .local 2>/dev/null; echo "--- bash history"; cat .bash_history $ cd . && ls -la skill && wc -l skill/SKILL.md && grep -n -i -E 'ad|competitor|hook|theme' skill/SKILL.md | head -5 model said: I read the skill and searched the project for source material. **I can't run the teardown yet, because there are no ads to tear down.** ## What I found - The project is `payments-api`, a small Express payments service (`src/index.js`, `package.json`, `README.md`). It has nothing to do with advertising. - The only ad-related files are the skill itself (`skill/SKILL.md`, `skill-card.md`, `_meta.js

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.