Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
architecture-principles
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
5ec76a5e5c547163
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package architecture-principles 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lahead -50find ./skill -type fhead -20 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd . && echo "=== README ===" && cat README.md && echo "=...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c cd . && ls -la && echo "---SKILL DIR---" && find ./skill ...
    • runls -la
    • runhead -50
    • runfind ./skill -type f
  • runbash -c cd . && cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -20; echo "...
    • runhead -20
    • runcat skill/SKILL.md
    • runls -R .
    • runhead -80
  • runbash -c cd . && echo "=== README ===" && cat README.md && echo "=...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -20
  • runbash -c cd . && echo "=== skill-card ===" && cat skill/skill-card...
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runtail -60 skill/SKILL.md

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 10.2s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env · 3 model steps, 4 commands

    $ cd . && ls -la && echo "---SKILL DIR---" && find ./skill -type f | head -50 $ cd . && cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -20; echo "---"; ls -R . 2>/dev/null | head -80 $ cd . && echo "=== README ===" && cat README.md && echo "=== package.json ===" && cat package.json && echo "=== .env (keys only) ===" && sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env && echo "=== src/index.js ===" && $ cd . && echo "=== skill-card ===" && cat skill/skill-card.md && echo "=== _meta ===" && cat skill/_meta.json && echo "=== SKILL.md tail ===" && tail -60 skill/SKILL.md model said: I've read the skill and the project. Before applying the principles, I need to flag something important about the request itself. ## The request is an X-Y problem (Principle 10) You asked me to "use the architecture-principles skill to do what it is for." But the skill is a **decision checklist**, not a task. It has no work to do until there is a decision on the table. So "do what it is for" is

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.