Findings
F01
Low
Loaded the project's .env file
- Confidence
- Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
- Observed in
- llm:baseline
Description
The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.
Impact
None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.
Remediation
No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.
F02
Low
Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)
- Confidence
- Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
- Observed in
- llm:baseline
Description
A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Impact
The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.
Remediation
Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.
References
- OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure
Process tree
run llm:baseline
Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.
- runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat R...
View full process tree
- runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
- runls -la
- runls -la skill
- runcat .mcp.json
- runcat ~/.claude.json
- runhead -50
- rungrep -i -E mcp|taplio
- runenv
- runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat R...
- runcat .env
- runcat package.json
- runcat README.md
- runls src
- runcat skill/_meta.json