



Target quantplay

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted mcp.quantplay.tech. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

Recommendation	Confidence	Findings
No action needed	n/a	0 high 0 med 2 info

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

Scope

Package	quantplay
Source	clawhub 1.0.1
SHA-256	1cf5f19a79ef819beaf51305f14284e41473ab86dbe9203e47aea0210121dff5
Files	3
Scanned	26 Oct 2026, 18:19 UTC
Engine	detonator 0.5.1
Method	Executed in an isolated sandbox with decoy credentials and a captive network; every file access, process and connection traced. 1 runs: baseline.
Note	batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

Findings summary

ID	Severity	Confidence	Finding
F01	Low	Info	Network destinations contacted
F02	Low	Info	Loaded the project's .env file

Observed behavior

Install step	none
Runs as	ls -la ./skill; cat ./skill/SKILL.md; head -50; cat ./skill/_meta.json; cat ./skill/skill-card.md; ls -la
Network	mcp.quantplay.tech (6 conn, 1392 B sent; while running)
Credentials	./env (read)
Files written	nothing outside its own folder



Finding details

F01 Network destinations contacted

Severity: Low Confidence: Info Observed in: llm:baseline
The package connected to these hosts.

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

```
mcp.quantplay.tech
```

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Loaded the project's .env file

Severity: Low Confidence: Info Observed in: llm:baseline
The package loaded the project's .env file.

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

```
./.env (by cat)
```

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Run log

llm:baseline ok 21.9s

new behavior: dns:mcp.quantplay.tech, exec:curl, ownread:./.env | 8 model steps, 7 commands

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator observed during these runs, not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.