Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted api.openai.com. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

3 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
imagegen
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
19cde3d0e2cbff03
Files
7
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package imagegen 7 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillcat skill/SKILL.mdhead -50 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • api.openai.com 3 connections, 459 B sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used a planted key with the service it belongs to (api.openai.com)

Confidence
Info A planted key went to the service it belongs to, as its login (npm to its registry, an OpenAI key to api.openai.com).
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted key was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the login header of its requests: npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing, or an app calling api.openai.com with the OpenAI key from .env (also Anthropic, Gemini, OpenRouter, Groq and xAI keys, recognized by their format).

Impact

Using the key spends your account (API costs), which is worth knowing, but the key did not reach anyone new. The key anywhere else in the request (for example inside a prompt), to any other host, or used to publish to npm, is reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv) sent only as the login header of requests to api.openai.com

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

api.openai.com

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by bash, cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill; echo "---"; cat sk...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runcat skill/SKILL.md
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat .gitignore
    • runls -la src
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/
    • runls skill/references skill/agents
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c cat skill/agents/openai.yaml; echo "---"; cat skill/refer...
    • runcat skill/agents/openai.yaml
    • runcat skill/references/prompting.md
    • runcat skill/references/sample-prompts.md
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline
    • runhead -20
  • runbash -c cat skill/agents/openai.yaml; echo "=== PROMPTING ==="; c...
    • runcat skill/agents/openai.yaml
    • runcat skill/references/prompting.md
  • runbash -c head -60 skill/references/prompting.md; echo "=== SAMPLE ...
    • runhead -60 skill/references/prompting.md
    • runhead -40 skill/references/sample-prompts.md
    • runenv
    • rungrep -iE openai|image|api
    • runsed s/=.*/=<set>/
    • runwhich python3 node curl
    • runpython3 -c import PIL; print('PIL', PIL.__version__)
    • runls ~/.codex
    • runhead
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
    • runcurl -sS -m 20 -o /dev/null
      • netapi.openai.com:443 sent 153 B
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
    • runpython3 -c import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print([m['id'] f...
    • runcurl -sS -m 20 https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H
      • netapi.openai.com:443 sent 153 B
  • runbash -c cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec...
    • secretread ./.env
    • runhead -c 1500
    • runcurl -sS -m 20 https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H
      • netapi.openai.com:443 sent 153 B
      • netDNS lookups for openai.com 6 queries

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 16.0s

    new behavior: dns:api.openai.com, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 8 model steps, 8 commands

    $ pwd; ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill; echo "---"; cat skill/SKILL.md | head -50 $ cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat .gitignore; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat .env | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/'; echo "---"; ls skill/references skill/agents; cat skil $ cat skill/agents/openai.yaml; echo "---"; cat skill/references/prompting.md; echo "---"; cat skill/references/sample-prompts.md; echo "---"; cat src/index.js; echo "---"; git log --oneline | head -20 $ cat skill/agents/openai.yaml; echo "=== PROMPTING ==="; cat skill/references/prompting.md $ head -60 skill/references/prompting.md; echo "=== SAMPLE ==="; head -40 skill/references/sample-prompts.md; echo "=== ENV ==="; env | grep -iE 'openai|image|api' | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/'; echo "=== TOOLS $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec74/work; set -a; . ./.env; set +a; curl -sS -m 20 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H "Authorization: Bearer $ $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec74/work; set -a; . ./.env; set +a; curl -sS -m 20 https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY" | python3 -c "imp $ cd /var/tmp/detonator-runs/a08646bfbfb745968756de1501bdec74/work; set -a; . ./.env; set +a; curl -sS -m 20 https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H "Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY" | head -c 1500 model said: I'll start by looking at the project and the skill files to understand what's available.

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.