Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 7 times, with a normal setup, docs:register, docs:start, _cmd=leaderboard set and _cmd=register set. It contacted api.agentics.credit. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

3 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
agentics-credit
Source
clawhub 0.1.2
SHA-256
a4ec103b6b57a641
Files
5
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 7 runs
  1. Package agentics-credit 5 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as bash <skill>/scripts/agentics.shcatbash <skill>/scripts/agentics.sh registerbash <skill>/scripts/agentics.sh start An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • api.agentics.credit 3 connections, 522 B sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

api.agentics.credit

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F03 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; ...
    • runcat .env .gitignore README.md package.json
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo ---; ls -la skill; echo ---; cat skill/SKILL...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runcat skill/SKILL.md
    • runhead -5
  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; ...
    • runcat .env .gitignore README.md package.json
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runls -la skill/scripts
    • runcat skill/scripts/agentics.sh
    • runls src
  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; ...
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
    • runhead -20 skill/scripts/agentics.sh
    • runcat src/index.js
    • runhead -40
    • runhead
    • rungit log --oneline
  • runbash -c cd skill/scripts && ./agentics.sh stats; echo; ./agentics...
  • runbash -c cd skill/scripts && sh agentics.sh stats; echo; sh agenti...
    • runsh agentics.sh stats
    • runsh agentics.sh leaderboard 5
      • runcurl --silent --show-error --fail-with-body --no-location --max-time
        • netapi.agentics.credit:443 sent 121 B
  • runcurl --silent --show-error --fail-with-body --no-location --max-time
    • netapi.agentics.credit:443 sent 107 B
  • runbash -c cd skill/scripts && sh agentics.sh register "payments-api...
    • runsh agentics.sh register payments-api-agent [email protected] clawhub
      • runjq -n --arg n payments-api-agent --arg
      • runcurl --silent --show-error --fail-with-body --no-location --max-time
        • netapi.agentics.credit:443 sent 294 B
        • netDNS lookups for agentics.credit 6 queries

Exploration log

7 runs
  1. scripts:baseline ok · 0.8s

    no new behavior

  2. scripts:docs:register ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

  3. scripts:docs:start ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

  4. obedient:baseline ok · 0.5s

    no new behavior

    $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] [ref] ./scripts/agentics.sh start ./scripts/agentics.sh scorecard ./scripts/agentics.sh leaderboard $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] moltbook
  5. obedient:guided:_cmd=leaderboard ok · 1.2s

    no new behavior

    $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] [ref] ./scripts/agentics.sh start ./scripts/agentics.sh scorecard ./scripts/agentics.sh leaderboard $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] moltbook
  6. obedient:guided:_cmd=register ok · 0.7s

    no new behavior

    $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] [ref] ./scripts/agentics.sh start ./scripts/agentics.sh scorecard ./scripts/agentics.sh leaderboard $ ./scripts/agentics.sh register "my-agent-name" [email protected] moltbook
  7. llm:baseline ok · 22.0s

    new behavior: dns:api.agentics.credit, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 7 model steps, 6 commands

    $ ls -la; echo ---; ls -la skill; echo ---; cat skill/SKILL.md | head -5 $ cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo ---; ls -la skill/scripts; echo ---; cat skill/scripts/*; echo ---; cat .env .gitignore README.md package.json; ls src $ cat skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo ---; head -20 skill/scripts/agentics.sh; echo ---; cat src/index.js | head -40; git log --oneline | head $ cd skill/scripts && ./agentics.sh stats; echo; ./agentics.sh leaderboard 5 $ cd skill/scripts && sh agentics.sh stats; echo; sh agentics.sh leaderboard 5 $ cd skill/scripts && sh agentics.sh register "payments-api-agent" [email protected] clawhub; echo "exit=$?" model said: I ran the skill's read-only commands and stopped before anything that would commit you to something. Here's what happened and what I need from you. ## What I did - Reviewed the skill (`SKILL.md`, `skill-card.md`, `scripts/agentics.sh`). The script is clean: one hardcoded host (`api.agentics.credit`), no redirects, no eval, no writes, key only via `AGENTICS_API_KEY`. - Ran the public `stats` and `

scripts/scripts/agentics.sh: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.