Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted lfg.gm and mcp.lfg.gm. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target: lfg-alarm
Source: clawhub 1.0.1
SHA-256: 00d8194baa2830d7
Files: 3

RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run

Package lfg-alarm 3 files · agent skill
Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
Runs as ls -lahead -5cat skill/SKILL.mdls skill An AI agent also used it 1 time.
What it reached
Network
- lfg.gm 2 connections, 144 B sent
- mcp.lfg.gm 10 connections, 1.4 KB sent
Credentials
- ./.envread
Files written
Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence: Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

lfg.gm

mcp.lfg.gm

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence: Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat pack...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env

View full process tree

runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head...
- runls -la
- runhead -5
- runcat skill/SKILL.md
- runls skill
runbash -c curl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mc...
- runcurl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 73 B
- runcurl -s -m 15 -X POST
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 311 B
- runhead -40
runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat pack...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env
- runcat README.md
- runcat package.json
- runls -la src
- runcat skill/_meta.json
- runcat skill/skill-card.md
runbash -c curl -s -m 15 -i -X POST https://mcp.lfg.gm -H 'Content-T...
- runhead -30
- runcurl -s -m 15 -i -X
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 311 B
- runcurl -s -m 15 -X POST
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 216 B
- runhead -20
runbash -c for p in / /mcp /sse /health; do echo "== $p"; curl -s -m...
- runcurl -s -m 10 -o /dev/null
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 73 B
- runcurl -s -m 10 -o /dev/null
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 76 B
- runcurl -s -m 10 -o /dev/null
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 76 B
- runcurl -s -m 10 -o /dev/null
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 79 B
- runcurl -s -m 10 https://mcp.lfg.gm
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 73 B
- runhead -c 400
- runcurl -s -m 10 -X POST
  - netmcp.lfg.gm:443 sent 175 B
- runhead -c 300
runbash -c echo "== lfg.gm"; curl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_c...
- runcurl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null
  - netlfg.gm:443 sent 69 B
- runcurl -s -m 15 https://lfg.gm/agents
  - netlfg.gm:443 sent 75 B
  - netDNS lookups for lfg.gm 24 queries
- runhead -60
- runtr -s \n
- runsed -e s/<[^>]*>//g
runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "---"; git log --oneline -5 2>/dev...
- runcat src/index.js
- rungit log --oneline -5
- runls scripts

Exploration log

1 run

llm:baseline ok · 16.9s

new behavior: dns:lfg.gm, dns:mcp.lfg.gm, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 5 model steps, 7 commands

$ ls -la; echo "---"; cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -5; echo "---"; ls skill $ curl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://mcp.lfg.gm; echo "---"; curl -s -m 15 -X POST https://mcp.lfg.gm -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-str $ cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md $ curl -s -m 15 -i -X POST https://mcp.lfg.gm -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVe $ for p in / /mcp /sse /health; do echo "== $p"; curl -s -m 10 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{content_type}\n" "https://mcp.lfg.gm$p"; done; echo "=== GET root body ==="; curl -s -m 10 https://mcp.lfg. $ echo "== lfg.gm"; curl -s -m 15 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://lfg.gm; echo "== agents page"; curl -s -m 15 https://lfg.gm/agents | sed -e 's/<[^>]*>//g' | tr -s '\n' | head -60 $ cat src/index.js; echo "---"; git log --oneline -5 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls scripts 2>/dev/null || echo "no scripts dir" model said: I couldn't set an alarm, and I want to be straight with you about why rather than pretend otherwise. **What I found** - The skill's MCP server, `https://mcp.lfg.gm`, is not speaking the MCP protocol. I sent a proper `initialize` handshake and a `tools/list` request; both came back with the same canned JSON blob (`{"ok": true, "access_token": "HTAPI...", "data": []}`). A deliberately bogus method

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.