Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
Raw JSONDownload PDF

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 5 times, with a normal setup, the environment variables it says it needs, PIXELVAULT_API_KEY set and cloud credentials present. It contacted api.pixelvault.dev. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

3 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
pixelvault-host-image
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
d8d322c50feee976
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 5 runs
  1. Package pixelvault-host-image 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as curl -sS -F file=@/path/to/image.png https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/imagescurl -sS -X POST https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images -Hcurl -sS -F file=@/path/to/image.png -H Authorization: Bearer HTENVdBKxs4is4V665PI09BYYtVNcurl -sS -F file=@/path/to/image.png -H Authorization: Bearer HTENVsQqMGMGapYWP3eWuJgeVfTW An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • api.pixelvault.dev 8 connections, 1.9 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
obedient:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

api.pixelvault.dev

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

The fake credential we configured was sent to its API (expected)

Confidence
Info The fake API key we configured to start the server was sent to its own service.
Observed in
obedient:declared-env

Description

A fake credential Detonator configured to start the server was sent to its own API.

Impact

Expected for servers that wrap an online service.

Evidence

$PIXELVAULT_API_KEY: sent to api.pixelvault.dev

Remediation

Confirm the host is the service the key belongs to.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo "--- card"; cat skill/skill-ca...
    • runsed -E s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; find . -maxdepth 3 -type f \( -iname ...
    • runls -la
    • runhead -50
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -type f
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "--- package.json"; cat package.json;...
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
    • runls -la skill
    • runcat .gitignore
  • runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo "--- card"; cat skill/skill-ca...
    • runsed -E s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && printf '\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n' > /dev/null; python...
    • runpython3 -
    • runls -l /tmp/pv-test.png
    • runfile /tmp/pv-test.png
  • runbash -c curl -sS -m 30 -w '\nHTTP %{http_code}\n' -F "file=@/tmp/...
    • runcurl -sS -m 30 -w \nHTTP %{http_code}\n
      • netapi.pixelvault.dev:443 sent 478 B
  • runbash -c curl -sS -m 30 -D /tmp/hdr.txt -o /tmp/body.json -F "file...
    • runcurl -sS -m 30 -D /tmp/hdr.txt
      • netapi.pixelvault.dev:443 sent 478 B
    • runcat /tmp/hdr.txt
    • runcat /tmp/body.json
    • runjq -r .data.url /tmp/body.json
  • runbash -c echo "--- DNS"; getent hosts api.pixelvault.dev || echo "...
    • rungetent hosts api.pixelvault.dev
    • runcurl -sS -m 15 -o /dev/null
      • netapi.pixelvault.dev:443 sent 90 B
    • runtimeout 15 openssl s_client -connect api.pixelvault.dev:443
      • runopenssl s_client -connect api.pixelvault.dev:443 -servername api.pixelvault.dev
        • netapi.pixelvault.dev:443 sent 1 B
        • netDNS lookups for pixelvault.dev 10 queries
    • runopenssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -dates
    • runenv
    • rungrep -iE proxy|pixelvault
    • runsed -E s/(KEY|TOKEN)=.*/\1=<redacted>/
  • runbash -c rm -f /tmp/pv-test.png /tmp/body.json /tmp/hdr.txt; echo ...
    • runrm -f /tmp/pv-test.png /tmp/body.json /tmp/hdr.txt

Exploration log

5 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 1.2s

    new behavior: dns:api.pixelvault.dev, exec:curl

    $ curl -sS -F "file=@/path/to/image.png" \ ${PIXELVAULT_API_KEY:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY"} \ https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images $ curl -sS -X POST https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"https://example.com/generated.png"}'
  2. obedient:declared-env ok · 1.9s

    new behavior: handover:config-secret-egress

    $ curl -sS -F "file=@/path/to/image.png" \ ${PIXELVAULT_API_KEY:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY"} \ https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images $ curl -sS -X POST https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"https://example.com/generated.png"}'
  3. obedient:guided:PIXELVAULT_API_KEY ok · 1.3s

    no new behavior

    $ curl -sS -F "file=@/path/to/image.png" \ ${PIXELVAULT_API_KEY:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY"} \ https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images $ curl -sS -X POST https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"https://example.com/generated.png"}'
  4. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 1.5s

    no new behavior

    $ curl -sS -F "file=@/path/to/image.png" \ ${PIXELVAULT_API_KEY:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY"} \ https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images $ curl -sS -X POST https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"https://example.com/generated.png"}'
  5. llm:baseline ok · 19.2s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env · 8 model steps, 8 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; find . -maxdepth 3 -type f \( -iname '*.png' -o -iname '*.jpg' -o -iname '*.jpeg' -o -iname '*.gif' -o -iname '*.webp' -o -iname '*.avif' -o -iname '*.svg' \) -not -path './skill/* $ cat README.md; echo "--- package.json"; cat package.json; echo "--- src"; ls -la src; echo "--- skill"; ls -la skill; echo "--- gitignore"; cat .gitignore $ cat skill/_meta.json; echo "--- card"; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "--- env keys present:"; sed -E 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env; echo "--- PIXELVAULT_API_KEY set in env? "; if [ -n "$PIXELVAULT_API_KEY $ cd /tmp && printf '\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n' > /dev/null; python3 - <<'EOF' import zlib, struct def chunk(t,d): c=t+d return struct.pack('>I',len(d))+c+struct.pack('>I',zlib.crc32(c)&0xffffffff) w=h= $ curl -sS -m 30 -w '\nHTTP %{http_code}\n' -F "file=@/tmp/pv-test.png" ${PIXELVAULT_API_KEY:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $PIXELVAULT_API_KEY"} https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images $ curl -sS -m 30 -D /tmp/hdr.txt -o /tmp/body.json -F "file=@/tmp/pv-test.png" https://api.pixelvault.dev/v1/images; echo "--- headers"; cat /tmp/hdr.txt; echo "--- body"; cat /tmp/body.json; echo; echo $ echo "--- DNS"; getent hosts api.pixelvault.dev || echo "no getent"; echo "--- resolve"; curl -sS -m 15 -o /dev/null -w 'ip=%{remote_ip} port=%{remote_port} code=%{http_code}\n' https://api.pixelvault $ rm -f /tmp/pv-test.png /tmp/body.json /tmp/hdr.txt; echo cleaned model said: The response is identical across calls (same `id`, same token) and contains no image URL. Let me check whether this is a real PixelVault response or something intercepting the request.

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.