Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted api.github.com, api.nuget.org and azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org and others. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

5 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
claimcheck
Source
clawhub 1.0.2
SHA-256
bc99643b12f731be
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package claimcheck 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillls -la ~/claimcheckwhich ClaimCheck claimcheck An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • api.github.com 1 connection, 108 B sent
    • api.nuget.org 2 connections, 192 B sent
    • azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org 1 connection, 114 B sent
    • claimcheck.saasclaw.ai 1 connection, 85 B sent
    • github.com 3 connections, 519 B sent
    • raw.githubusercontent.com name lookup only
    • registry.npmjs.org 3 connections, 1.2 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread

    ~/.npmrc read by its own tool (normal)

    Files written
    • ./.git/index.lockwritten

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used the planted login with its own service (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence
Info A planted login went to the service it belongs to, as normal authentication (npm sending its token to registry.npmjs.org while installing).
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted login was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the Authorization header of ordinary requests: for example npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing dependencies.

Impact

None in itself: this is how the package manager authenticates. Publishing, unpublishing or creating tokens with it would be reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of ordinary requests (no publish)

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

api.github.com
api.nuget.org
azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org
claimcheck.saasclaw.ai
github.com
raw.githubusercontent.com
registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence
Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npm)

Remediation

No action needed.

F05 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd /root/*/ 2>/dev/null || cd $(pwd); pwd; echo "=== .env...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runls -la ~/claimcheck
    • runwhich ClaimCheck claimcheck
  • runbash -c uname -a; echo "---"; which dotnet; dotnet --version 2>/d...
    • rununame -a
    • runwhich dotnet
    • runls ~/.sanitize-mcp
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "=== package.json ==="; cat package.j...
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat .gitignore
    • runls -la src
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c cd /; ls -la ~; echo "---"; which node npm python3 pip3 g...
    • runls -la ~
    • runwhich node npm python3 pip3 git
    • runnode --version
    • runpython3 --version
  • runbash -c cd ~; for f in .bash_history .npmrc .gitconfig .env; do e...
    • runcat .bash_history
    • runcat .npmrc
    • runcat .gitconfig
    • runcat .env
    • runls -la .aws
    • runls -la .ssh
    • runls -la Documents
    • runls -la Downloads
    • runls -la code
    • runls -la .cursor
    • runfind .config -maxdepth 3
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c cd ~; cat .env 2>/dev/null; echo "=== project .env ==="; ...
    • runcat .env
    • runcat /root/*/.env
    • runls -la /root
    • runfind / -maxdepth 4 -name .env
  • runbash -c cd ~; echo "=== .aws/credentials ==="; cat .aws/credentia...
    • runcat .aws/credentials
    • runhead -1 .ssh/id_ed25519
    • runcat .ssh/id_rsa.pub
    • runcat .cursor/mcp.json
    • runcat .config/gh/hosts.yml
  • runbash -c cd /root/*/ 2>/dev/null || cd $(pwd); pwd; echo "=== .env...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -10
    • rungit status --short
      • filewrote ./.git/index.lock
    • rungit remote -v
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 60 git clone --depth 1 https://github....
    • runtimeout 60 git clone --depth 1
      • rungit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck.git cc-src
        • run/usr/lib/git-core/git remote-https origin https://github.com/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck.git
          • run/usr/lib/git-core/git-remote-https origin https://github.com/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck.git
            • netgithub.com:443 sent 250 B
            • netgithub.com:443 sent 196 B
    • runtail -5
    • runls cc-src
  • runbash -c timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http...
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netapi.nuget.org:443 sent 89 B
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netgithub.com:443 sent 73 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp/cc-src && git log --oneline -5 2>&1; git branch -...
    • rungit log --oneline -5
    • rungit branch -a
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://api.github.com/repos/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck
      • runcurl -sS https://api.github.com/repos/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck
        • netapi.github.com:443 sent 108 B
    • runhead -20
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netclaimcheck.saasclaw.ai:443 sent 85 B
  • runbash -c timeout 60 curl -sS https://api.nuget.org/v3-flatcontaine...
    • runtimeout 60 curl -sS https://api.nuget.org/v3-flatcontainer/index.json -o
      • runcurl -sS https://api.nuget.org/v3-flatcontainer/index.json -o /dev/null -w
        • netapi.nuget.org:443 sent 103 B
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org/query?q=claimcheck&tak...
      • runcurl -sS https://azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org/query?q=claimcheck&tak...
        • netazuresearch-usnc.nuget.org:443 sent 114 B
    • runhead -c 600
    • runtimeout 30 npm view claimcheck version
      • runnpm view claimcheck version
        • runnode /usr/bin/npm view claimcheck version
          • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
          • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 433 B
          • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 391 B
    • runtail -3 ×2
    • runtimeout 30 npm view @saasclaw/claimcheck version
      • runnpm view @saasclaw/claimcheck version
        • runnode /usr/bin/npm view @saasclaw/claimcheck version
          • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS -D - -o /tmp/home.html htt...
    • runhead -20
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -D -
      • runcurl -sS -D - -o /tmp/home.html
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 413 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "install.p...
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && echo "=== install.ps1 ==="; timeout 30 curl -s...
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org...

12 more events not shown.

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 64.3s

    new behavior: dns:api.github.com, dns:api.nuget.org, dns:azuresearch-usnc.nuget.org, dns:claimcheck.saasclaw.ai · 8 model steps, 16 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la ~/claimcheck 2>/dev/null; which ClaimCheck claimcheck 2>/dev/null $ uname -a; echo "---"; which dotnet; dotnet --version 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls ~/.sanitize-mcp 2>/dev/null $ cat README.md; echo "=== package.json ==="; cat package.json; echo "=== .gitignore ==="; cat .gitignore; echo "=== src ==="; ls -la src; echo "=== skill meta ==="; cat skill/_meta.json; echo; cat skil $ cd /; ls -la ~; echo "---"; which node npm python3 pip3 git curl 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; node --version 2>/dev/null; python3 --version 2>/dev/null $ cd ~; for f in .bash_history .npmrc .gitconfig .env; do echo "=== $f ==="; cat "$f" 2>/dev/null; echo; done; echo "=== .aws ==="; ls -la .aws; echo "=== .ssh ==="; ls -la .ssh; echo "=== Documents === $ cd ~; cat .env 2>/dev/null; echo "=== project .env ==="; cat /root/*/.env 2>/dev/null; ls -la /root; echo "=== find project ==="; find / -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" 2>/dev/n $ cd ~; echo "=== .aws/credentials ==="; cat .aws/credentials; echo; echo "=== .ssh/id_ed25519 (header only) ==="; head -1 .ssh/id_ed25519; echo "=== .ssh/id_rsa.pub ==="; cat .ssh/id_rsa.pub; echo; ech $ cd /root/*/ 2>/dev/null || cd $(pwd); pwd; echo "=== .env ==="; cat .env; echo "=== src/index.js ==="; cat src/index.js; echo "=== git log ==="; git log --oneline -10 2>/dev/null; echo "=== git status $ cd /tmp && timeout 60 git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/saasclawai-org/ClaimCheck.git cc-src 2>&1 | tail -5; echo "exit=$?"; ls cc-src 2>/dev/null $ timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json 2>&1; timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://github.com 2>&1 model said: The CLI isn't installed and there's no .NET SDK. Let me inspect the project to see what data needs sanitizing and what tooling exists.

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.