Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and cloud credentials present. It contacted finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
ofac-crypto-address-check
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
33a6e59cb4d48bd8
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package ofac-crypto-address-check 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as curl -s -X POST https://finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev... -Hls -la ./skillhead -50cat ./skill/SKILL.md An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev 3 connections, 996 B sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
obedient:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo ---; cat package.json; echo ---; ls -...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la ./skill && cat ./skill/SKILL.md | head -50
    • runls -la ./skill
    • runhead -50
    • runcat ./skill/SKILL.md
  • runbash -c cat ./skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat ./skill/skill-card....
    • runcat ./skill/_meta.json
    • runcat ./skill/skill-card.md
    • runls -la
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo ---; cat package.json; echo ---; ls -...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
    • runcat .gitignore
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo ---; git log --oneline -5
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -5

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.6s

    new behavior: dns:finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev, exec:curl

    $ curl -s -X POST https://finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"
  2. obedient:ci-github ok · 0.9s

    no new behavior

    $ curl -s -X POST https://finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"
  3. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 1.1s

    no new behavior

    $ curl -s -X POST https://finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"
  4. llm:baseline ok · 10.3s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env · 5 model steps, 4 commands

    $ ls -la ./skill && cat ./skill/SKILL.md | head -50 $ cat ./skill/_meta.json; echo ---; cat ./skill/skill-card.md; echo ---; ls -la $ cat README.md; echo ---; cat package.json; echo ---; ls -la src; echo ---; cat .gitignore; echo ---; sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env $ cat src/index.js; echo ---; git log --oneline -5 model said: The skill is installed and I've read it. It's a screening tool that needs a wallet address to check — and no address was provided in your request. **What the skill does:** it sends an address to Finch's MCP endpoint (`finch-agent-catalog.finch-catalog-mcp.workers.dev`) and does an exact-match lookup against the digital-currency addresses on the US Treasury OFAC SDN list. It returns `listed_on_ofa

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.