Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and cloud credentials present. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
taplio-linkedin-swipe-file-builder
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
4b59700f31d0af79
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package linkedin-swipe-file-builder 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la ./skillhead -50cat ~/.claude.json An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F02 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat R...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la ./skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la ./skill
    • runhead -50
    • runcat ~/.claude.json
    • runls ~/.config
  • runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat R...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat package.json
    • runcat README.md
    • runls -la src
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c which claude; claude mcp list 2>&1 | head -20; echo "---"...
    • runwhich claude
    • runhead -20
    • runls ~/.claude
    • runcat ~/.claude/settings.json
    • runenv
    • rungrep -i -E mcp|taplio

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.9s

    no new behavior

    $ SWIPE FILE STRUCTURE [The columns and a 2-row example, ready to copy into Notion / Sheet / Airtable] 30-DAY HABIT [A simple daily prompt the user can follow] REVIEW QUESTIONS (every 2 weeks) 1. What h $ DRAFTS FROM YOUR SWIPE FILE (validate which to keep) 1. Modeled on : [author / hook pattern of swiped post #1] Your draft : [full post in the user's voice - reuses the structure, not the substan
  2. obedient:ci-github ok · 0.7s

    no new behavior

    $ SWIPE FILE STRUCTURE [The columns and a 2-row example, ready to copy into Notion / Sheet / Airtable] 30-DAY HABIT [A simple daily prompt the user can follow] REVIEW QUESTIONS (every 2 weeks) 1. What h $ DRAFTS FROM YOUR SWIPE FILE (validate which to keep) 1. Modeled on : [author / hook pattern of swiped post #1] Your draft : [full post in the user's voice - reuses the structure, not the substan
  3. obedient:cloud-creds ok · 0.6s

    no new behavior

    $ SWIPE FILE STRUCTURE [The columns and a 2-row example, ready to copy into Notion / Sheet / Airtable] 30-DAY HABIT [A simple daily prompt the user can follow] REVIEW QUESTIONS (every 2 weeks) 1. What h $ DRAFTS FROM YOUR SWIPE FILE (validate which to keep) 1. Modeled on : [author / hook pattern of swiped post #1] Your draft : [full post in the user's voice - reuses the structure, not the substan
  4. llm:baseline ok · 9.8s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env · 4 model steps, 3 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la ./skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; cat ~/.claude.json 2>/dev/null | head -50; echo "---"; ls ~/.config 2>/dev/null $ cat .env; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md $ which claude; claude mcp list 2>&1 | head -20; echo "---"; ls ~/.claude 2>/dev/null; cat ~/.claude/settings.json 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; env | grep -i -E "mcp|taplio" model said: I can't run this skill right now: the Taplio MCP isn't connected. The skill's first step is to call `get_me` on the Taplio MCP, and it explicitly says to stop there if that call can't be made. In this environment there are no Taplio tools available (no MCP server is configured, and no Taplio credentials or connector are present), so I can't read your niche, search the live inspiration index, pull

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.