Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, a GitHub Actions environment and cloud credentials present. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target: taplio-linkedin-profile-optimizer
Source: clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256: b57c146e85d7b8cd
Files: 3

RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 4 runs

Package linkedin-profile-optimizer 3 files · agent skill
Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
Runs as ls -lals -la skillcat skill/SKILL.mdhead -50 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
What it reached
Network
No connections.
Credentials
- ./.envread
Files written
Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence: Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env

View full process tree

runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
- runls -la
- runls -la skill
- runcat skill/SKILL.md
- runhead -50
runbash -c cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env
- runcat skill/_meta.json
- runcat skill/skill-card.md
- runcat README.md
- runcat package.json
- runls -la src
- runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/

Exploration log

4 runs

obedient:baseline ok · 0.4s

no new behavior

$ PROFILE AUDIT FOR [user] POSITIONING IN ONE LINE (as I read it from the current profile) : "[1-line summary, then ask : is this the positioning you actually want ?]" SCORES - Headline : X/5 - [one-lin
obedient:ci-github ok · 0.4s

no new behavior

$ PROFILE AUDIT FOR [user] POSITIONING IN ONE LINE (as I read it from the current profile) : "[1-line summary, then ask : is this the positioning you actually want ?]" SCORES - Headline : X/5 - [one-lin
obedient:cloud-creds ok · 0.4s

no new behavior

$ PROFILE AUDIT FOR [user] POSITIONING IN ONE LINE (as I read it from the current profile) : "[1-line summary, then ask : is this the positioning you actually want ?]" SCORES - Headline : X/5 - [one-lin
llm:baseline ok · 7.4s

new behavior: ownread:./.env · 3 model steps, 2 commands

$ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; cat skill/SKILL.md 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat .env | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' model said: I can't run this skill. The **Taplio MCP is not connected** in this environment — there are no Taplio tools available (no `get_me`, no `search_inspiration`), and the skill explicitly forbids producing an audit without it. So I'm stopping here rather than guessing at your profile. **To get set up:** 1. **Start a free Taplio account/trial:** https://app.taplio.com/signin?utm_source=CLIENT&utm_medi

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.