Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted registry.npmjs.org. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

4 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target: reelary
Source: clawhub 0.1.0
SHA-256: 9d42b71c9957c782
Files: 6

RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run

Package reelary 6 files · agent skill
Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
Runs as ls -lals -R skillhead -50cat skill/references/install.md An AI agent also used it 1 time.
What it reached
Network
- registry.npmjs.org 2 connections, 874 B sent
Credentials
- ./.envread
~/.npmrc read by its own tool (normal)
Files written
Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used the planted login with its own service (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence: Info A planted login went to the service it belongs to, as normal authentication (npm sending its token to registry.npmjs.org while installing).
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A planted login was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the Authorization header of ordinary requests: for example npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing dependencies.

Impact

None in itself: this is how the package manager authenticates. Publishing, unpublishing or creating tokens with it would be reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of ordinary requests (no publish)

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence: Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence: Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence: Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npx)

Remediation

No action needed.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

runbash -c cat skill/references/troubleshooting.md; echo "=== README...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env

View full process tree

runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -R skill 2>/dev/null | head -50
- runls -la
- runls -R skill
- runhead -50
runbash -c cat skill/references/install.md 2>/dev/null; echo "=== TO...
- runcat skill/references/install.md
- runcat skill/references/tools.md
runbash -c cat skill/references/troubleshooting.md; echo "=== README...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env
- runcat skill/references/troubleshooting.md
- runcat README.md
- runcat package.json
- runls -la src
runbash -c which npx node; node -v 2>/dev/null; uname -a; echo "---"...
- runwhich npx node
- runnode -v
- rununame -a
- runnpx -y reelary status
  - runnode /usr/bin/npx -y reelary status
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 433 B
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 441 B
    - netDNS lookups for npmjs.org 2 queries
- runhead -30
runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "=== git log ==="; git log --oneli...
- runcat src/index.js
- rungit log --oneline -5
- runcat skill/skill-card.md
- runcat skill/_meta.json

Exploration log

1 run

llm:baseline ok · 29.1s

new behavior: dns:registry.npmjs.org, ownread:./.env, ownread:~/.npmrc, write:~/.npm/_cacache/content-v2/sha512/cd/c8/* · 4 model steps, 5 commands

$ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -R skill 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ cat skill/references/install.md 2>/dev/null; echo "=== TOOLS ==="; cat skill/references/tools.md 2>/dev/null $ cat skill/references/troubleshooting.md; echo "=== README ==="; cat README.md; echo "=== PKG ==="; cat package.json; echo "=== ENV ==="; cat .env; echo "=== SRC ==="; ls -la src $ which npx node; node -v 2>/dev/null; uname -a; echo "---"; npx -y reelary status 2>&1 | head -30 $ cat src/index.js; echo "=== git log ==="; git log --oneline -5 2>/dev/null; echo "=== skill-card ==="; cat skill/skill-card.md; cat skill/_meta.json model said: I checked the skill and the environment, and I stopped before installing anything. Here's where things stand. ## What I found **1. The `reelary_*` tools are not available.** There is no `reelary_status`, `reelary_list_folders`, etc. in this session, so Reelary isn't installed or connected here. **2. This machine can't run Reelary anyway.** Reelary requires macOS 12+ or Windows 10/11 x64. This e

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.