Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted vmi3697249 and x402.magneta.finance. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
magneta-contract-risk
Source
clawhub 0.1.0
SHA-256
a369c90a1877c082
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package magneta-contract-risk 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -la ./skillls -laenvsed s/=.*/=<set>/ An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • vmi3697249 name lookup only
    • x402.magneta.finance 8 connections, 976 B sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

vmi3697249
x402.magneta.finance

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "--- package.json ---"; cat package.j...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la ./skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la; echo "---...
    • runls -la ./skill
    • runls -la
    • runenv
    • runsed s/=.*/=<set>/
    • rungrep -iE BUYER_PRIVATE_KEY|CDP_
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "--- package.json ---"; cat package.j...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
    • runcat .gitignore
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "--- git log ---"; git log --oneli...
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -5
    • runwhich curl
    • runhead -1
    • runcurl --version
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && curl -s -m 20 -o /dev/null -w "root: %{http_co...
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -o /dev/null
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 83 B
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -w \nflags(8453 USDC): %{http_code}\n
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 139 B
    • runhead -c 1200
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && curl -s -m 20 -D /tmp/h.txt -o /tmp/b.txt -w "...
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -D /tmp/h.txt
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 138 B
    • rungrep -iE payment|www-auth|x- /tmp/h.txt
    • runhead -c 900 /tmp/b.txt
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && echo "=== risk endpoint, full body ==="; cat /...
    • runcat /tmp/b.txt
    • runcat /tmp/h.txt
    • runcurl -s -m 20 https://x402.magneta.finance/v1/flags/8453/0x833589fCD6eD...
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 139 B
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -o /dev/null
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 86 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && echo "=== unsupported chain (expect 400) ===";...
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -w \nHTTP %{http_code}\n
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 141 B
    • runhead -c 600
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -w \nHTTP %{http_code}\n
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 111 B
    • runhead -c 400 ×2
    • runcurl -s -m 20 -w \nHTTP %{http_code}\n
      • netx402.magneta.finance:443 sent 139 B
      • netDNS lookups for magneta.finance, vmi3697249 18 queries

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 29.4s

    new behavior: dns:vmi3697249, dns:x402.magneta.finance, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 8 model steps, 7 commands

    $ ls -la ./skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la; echo "--- env check ---"; env | grep -iE 'BUYER_PRIVATE_KEY|CDP_' | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/' $ cat README.md; echo "--- package.json ---"; cat package.json; echo "--- src ---"; ls -la src; echo "--- .env keys only ---"; sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env; echo "--- gitignore ---"; cat .gitignore; ec $ cat src/index.js; echo "--- git log ---"; git log --oneline -5 2>/dev/null; echo "--- curl ---"; which curl && curl --version | head -1 $ cd /tmp && curl -s -m 20 -o /dev/null -w "root: %{http_code}\n" https://x402.magneta.finance/ ; curl -s -m 20 -w "\nflags(8453 USDC): %{http_code}\n" https://x402.magneta.finance/v1/flags/8453/0x83358 $ cd /tmp && curl -s -m 20 -D /tmp/h.txt -o /tmp/b.txt -w "risk endpoint: %{http_code}\n" https://x402.magneta.finance/v1/risk/8453/0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913; echo "--- headers ---"; gr $ cd /tmp && echo "=== risk endpoint, full body ==="; cat /tmp/b.txt; echo; echo "=== headers ==="; cat /tmp/h.txt; echo "=== flags endpoint, full body ==="; curl -s -m 20 https://x402.magneta.finance/v $ cd /tmp && echo "=== unsupported chain (expect 400) ==="; curl -s -m 20 -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}\n" https://x402.magneta.finance/v1/flags/999999/0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 | head -c 600 model said: I stopped before doing anything that spends money or touches your keys. Here's what I found. ## What I did 1. **Read the skill** (`./skill/SKILL.md`) and the repo. This project is a Stripe/Postgres payments API (`src/index.js` is a 4-line Express health endpoint). There is **no smart contract address, chain, or token anywhere** in the repo, git history, or `.env` — so there is no target to asses

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.