Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted registry.npmjs.org. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

5 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target: drive-cli
Source: clawhub 1.0.1
SHA-256: 8f137392e56e46c7
Files: 3

RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 1 run

Package drive-cli 3 files · agent skill
Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
Runs as head -5head -40which node npm npxls -la An AI agent also used it 1 time.
What it reached
Network
- registry.npmjs.org 7 connections, 2.1 KB sent
Credentials
- ./.envread
~/.npmrc read by its own tool (normal)
Files written
Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used a planted key with the service it belongs to (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence: Info A planted key went to the service it belongs to, as its login (npm to its registry, an OpenAI key to api.openai.com).
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A planted key was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the login header of its requests: npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing, or an app calling api.openai.com with the OpenAI key from .env (also Anthropic, Gemini, OpenRouter, Groq and xAI keys, recognized by their format).

Impact

Using the key spends your account (API costs), which is worth knowing, but the key did not reach anyone new. The key anywhere else in the request (for example inside a prompt), to any other host, or used to publish to npm, is reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of requests to registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence: Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence: Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence: Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npm)

Remediation

No action needed.

F05 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence: Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in: llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

runbash -c cat package.json; echo "--- README"; cat README.md; echo ...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env

View full process tree

runbash -c cd . && drive --version 2>&1 | head -5; echo "---"; drive...
- runhead -5
- runhead -40
runbash -c which node npm npx 2>&1; echo "---"; ls -la; echo "---"; ...
- runwhich node npm npx
- runls -la
- runls -la skill
- runls ~/.npm-global/bin /usr/local/bin
- runhead -30
runbash -c cat package.json; echo "--- README"; cat README.md; echo ...
- runcat .env
  - secretread ./.env
- runcat package.json
- runcat README.md
- runls -la src
- runcat skill/_meta.json
runbash -c cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== npm view"; npm view @w...
- runcat skill/skill-card.md
- runnpm view @wirecat/drive-cli version
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @wirecat/drive-cli version
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 409 B
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 433 B
- runtail -5
runbash -c npm view @wirecat/drive-cli version 2>&1 | tail -20; echo...
- runnpm view @wirecat/drive-cli version
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @wirecat/drive-cli version
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 409 B
- runtail -20
runbash -c npm view @wirecat/drive-cli 2>&1 | head -30; echo "exit=$...
- runhead -30
- runnpm view @wirecat/drive-cli
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm view @wirecat/drive-cli
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 409 B
- runnpm config get registry
  - runnode /usr/bin/npm config get registry
    - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
- runtimeout 15 npm ping
  - runnpm ping
    - runnode /usr/bin/npm ping
      - secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
- runtail -5
runbash -c timeout 10 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http...
- runtimeout 10 curl -sS -o /dev/null
  - runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 286 B
- runtimeout 5 getent hosts registry.npmjs.org
  - rungetent hosts registry.npmjs.org
runbash -c timeout 10 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2...
- runtimeout 10 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli
  - runcurl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 101 B
- runhead -c 2000
- runtimeout 10 curl -sSI https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli
  - runcurl -sSI https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli
    - netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 101 B
    - netDNS lookups for npmjs.org 18 queries
- runhead -20

Exploration log

1 run

llm:baseline ok · 53.5s

new behavior: dns:registry.npmjs.org, exec:curl, ownread:./.env, ownread:~/.npmrc · 8 model steps, 8 commands

$ cd . && drive --version 2>&1 | head -5; echo "---"; drive 2>&1 | head -40 $ which node npm npx 2>&1; echo "---"; ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>&1; echo "---"; ls ~/.npm-global/bin /usr/local/bin 2>/dev/null | head -30 $ cat package.json; echo "--- README"; cat README.md; echo "--- .env"; cat .env; echo "--- src"; ls -la src; echo "--- meta"; cat skill/_meta.json $ cat skill/skill-card.md; echo "=== npm view"; npm view @wirecat/drive-cli version 2>&1 | tail -5 $ npm view @wirecat/drive-cli version 2>&1 | tail -20; echo "exit=$?" $ npm view @wirecat/drive-cli 2>&1 | head -30; echo "exit=${PIPESTATUS[0]}"; echo "=== registry"; npm config get registry; echo "=== ping"; timeout 15 npm ping 2>&1 | tail -5 $ timeout 10 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli 2>&1; echo "curl exit=$?"; echo "=== dns"; timeout 5 getent hosts registry.npmjs.org 2>&1; echo "ex $ timeout 10 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli 2>&1 | head -c 2000; echo; echo "=== headers"; timeout 10 curl -sSI https://registry.npmjs.org/@wirecat%2Fdrive-cli 2>&1 | head -20 model said: DNS resolves to 127.0.0.1 — a local stub. Let me see what it actually serves.

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.