Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
ai-output-verification-trust-tiers
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
62eaa19f68e1cb5a
Files
5
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package ai-output-verification-trust-tiers 5 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -R skillhead -50find . -maxdepth 3 -type f An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written
    • ./.git/index.lockwritten
    • ./docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.mdwritten

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---PKG"; cat package.json; echo "---...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -R skill 2>/dev/null | head -50
    • runls -la
    • runls -R skill
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c find . -maxdepth 3 -type f \( -name "*.md" -o -name "*.tx...
    • runfind . -maxdepth 3 -type f
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---PKG"; cat package.json; echo "---...
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
  • runbash -c cat skill/examples/mata-v-avianca-fabricated-citations-20...
    • runcat skill/examples/mata-v-avianca-fabricated-citations-2023.md
    • runcat skill/references/sources.md
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "---GIT"; git log --oneline -15; e...
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -15
    • rungit status --short
      • filewrote ./.git/index.lock
  • runbash -c mkdir -p docs && printf '%s\n' '# AI Output Verification ...
    • filewrote ./docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.md
    • runmkdir -p docs
    • runwc -l docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.md

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 43.4s

    new behavior: ownread:./.env, write:./.git/index, write:./.git/index.lock, write:./docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.md · 8 model steps, 10 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -R skill 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ find . -maxdepth 3 -type f \( -name "*.md" -o -name "*.txt" -o -name "*.json" -o -name "*.yaml" -o -name "*.yml" \) -not -path "./skill/*" | head -50 $ cat README.md; echo "---PKG"; cat package.json; echo "---SRC"; ls -la src; echo "---ENV keys"; sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/' .env $ cat skill/examples/mata-v-avianca-fabricated-citations-2023.md; echo "=== SOURCES"; cat skill/references/sources.md $ cat src/index.js; echo "---GIT"; git log --oneline -15; echo "---BRANCH"; git status --short $ $ $ $ mkdir -p docs && printf '%s\n' '# AI Output Verification — Trust Tiers' > docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.md && wc -l docs/ai-output-trust-tiers.md $ model said: I'll start by looking at the project to see what context exists for the AI outputs in question.

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.