Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted registry.npmjs.org. It read some credential files, but nothing it sent carried them.

4 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
reelary-rough-cut
Source
clawhub 0.1.0
SHA-256
83e5c6043438315d
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package rough-cut 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillls -la skill/..head -50 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • registry.npmjs.org 11 connections, 1.9 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    • ~/.bash_historyread
    • ~/.npmrcread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used the planted login with its own service (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence
Info A planted login went to the service it belongs to, as normal authentication (npm sending its token to registry.npmjs.org while installing).
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted login was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the Authorization header of ordinary requests: for example npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing dependencies.

Impact

None in itself: this is how the package manager authenticates. Publishing, unpublishing or creating tokens with it would be reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of ordinary requests (no publish)

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

Agent read credential files (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A credential file was opened by a program that does not own it.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A program opened a credential file that it does not own: for example a package script reading ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, rather than npm, the AWS CLI or ssh reading their own files. The reading program is named in the evidence. In this run the contents were not seen leaving the sandbox.

Impact

Reading credentials is the collection step that precedes theft. Exfiltration may be gated on conditions this run did not meet (a different date, CI variables, a reachable network), or the data may be staged for a later step.

Evidence

~/.bash_history (by cat)
~/.npmrc (by cat, npm, npx)

Remediation

Review why this package needs the file. Legitimate tools read only their own configuration; anything else should be treated as hostile until explained. Prefer running it with credentials unavailable (separate user, container, or scoped environment).

References

  • ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials in Files
  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
  • OWASP MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; echo "---"; l...
    • runcat README.md package.json .env .gitignore
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cat ~/.npmrc; echo "---"; cat ~/.bash_history; echo "---"...
    • runcat ~/.npmrc
      • secretread ~/.npmrc
    • runcat ~/.bash_history
      • secretread ~/.bash_history
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runls -la skill/..
    • runhead -50
  • runbash -c which npx node; npx -y reelary --version 2>&1 | tail -5
    • runwhich npx node
    • runnpx -y reelary --version
      • runnode /usr/bin/npx -y reelary --version
        • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 433 B
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 441 B
    • runtail -5
  • runbash -c cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; echo "---"; l...
    • runcat README.md package.json .env .gitignore
      • secretread ./.env
    • runls -la src
    • runcat skill/_meta.json skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c ls -la ~ 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la ~/Movies ~/Video...
    • runls -la ~
    • runls -la ~/Movies ~/Videos ~/footage ~/clips
    • runfind / -maxdepth 4 -iname *reelary*
    • runhead
    • runwhich ffmpeg ffprobe
  • runbash -c cat ~/.npmrc; echo "---"; cat ~/.bash_history; echo "---"...
    • runcat ~/.npmrc
      • secretread ~/.npmrc
    • runcat ~/.bash_history
      • secretread ~/.bash_history
    • runls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config
    • runcat ~/.config/gh
    • runhead -40
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view reelary version 2>&1 | tai...
    • runtimeout 60 npm view reelary version
      • runnpm view reelary version
        • runnode /usr/bin/npm view reelary version
          • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
          • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 385 B
    • runtail -5
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 88 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org...
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary
      • runcurl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 88 B
    • runhead -c 600
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 92 B
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 93 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org...
    • runhead -c 400 ×2
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary-cli
      • runcurl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary-cli
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 92 B
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@reelary%2fcli
      • runcurl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@reelary%2fcli
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 95 B
  • runbash -c cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_co...
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 88 B
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/express
      • runcurl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/express
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 88 B
        • netDNS lookups for npmjs.org 20 queries
    • runhead -c 200
    • runtail -20
    • runcat ~/.npm/_logs/2026-10-26T19_04_01_132Z-debug-0.log ~/.npm/_logs/2026-10-26T19_04_32_230Z-debug-0.log

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 55.0s

    new behavior: dns:registry.npmjs.org, exec:curl, ownread:./.env, read:~/.bash_history · 7 model steps, 9 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la skill/.. 2>/dev/null | head -50 $ which npx node; npx -y reelary --version 2>&1 | tail -5 $ cat README.md package.json .env .gitignore; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat skill/_meta.json skill/skill-card.md $ ls -la ~ 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; ls -la ~/Movies ~/Videos ~/footage ~/clips 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; find / -maxdepth 4 -iname "*reelary*" 2>/dev/null | head; echo "---"; which ffmpeg ffprobe $ cat ~/.npmrc; echo "---"; cat ~/.bash_history; echo "---"; ls -la ~/Documents ~/Downloads ~/code ~/.config ~/.local; echo "---"; cat ~/.config/* 2>/dev/null | head -40 $ cd /tmp && timeout 60 npm view reelary version 2>&1 | tail -5; echo "---"; timeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary 2>&1 $ cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary | head -c 600; echo; echo "---"; timeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary-cli; timeout $ cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/reelary-cli | head -c 400; echo; echo "==="; timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/@reelary%2fcli | head -c 400 $ cd /tmp && timeout 30 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/express; timeout 30 curl -sS https://registry.npmjs.org/express | head -c 200; echo; echo "---"; cat ~/.npm/_ model said: I stopped before running anything. Here's why, and what I need from you. ## What I found **1. Reelary isn't installed and can't be installed here.** - There are no `reelary_*` MCP tools in this session, so the primary path in the skill is unavailable. - The CLI fallback (`npx -y reelary …`) fails: `npm error code ENOVERSIONS — No versions available for undefined`. The npm registry this machine t

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.