Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, the environment variables it says it needs and a GitHub Actions environment. It contacted developers.juicer.io and registry.npmjs.org. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

5 findings. Scanned 26 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
juicer-competitor-checker
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
ba705512aefa8264
Files
2
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-26

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package juicer-competitor-checker 2 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillgrep -i juicerenv An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • developers.juicer.io 2 connections, 186 B sent
    • registry.npmjs.org 4 connections, 1.4 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread

    ~/.npmrc read by its own tool (normal)

    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Used the planted login with its own service (registry.npmjs.org)

Confidence
Info A planted login went to the service it belongs to, as normal authentication (npm sending its token to registry.npmjs.org while installing).
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted login was sent to the service it belongs to, only as the Authorization header of ordinary requests: for example npm sending the ~/.npmrc token to registry.npmjs.org while installing dependencies.

Impact

None in itself: this is how the package manager authenticates. Publishing, unpublishing or creating tokens with it would be reported as exfiltration.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (npm) sent only as the login header of ordinary requests (no publish)

Remediation

No action needed.

F02 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

developers.juicer.io
registry.npmjs.org

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F03 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat, grep)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

F04 Low

A tool read its own credentials (e.g. gh, aws, ssh)

Confidence
Info A tool opened its own login or config file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A tool opened its own configuration or login file, such as npm reading ~/.npmrc or gh reading its hosts file.

Impact

None in itself: this is how those tools work. Listed so the report shows every credential access.

Evidence

~/.npmrc (by npm, npx)

Remediation

No action needed.

F05 Low

Agent put secrets in the model's context (may be the agent's own choice)

Confidence
Info A planted secret appeared in text sent to the AI model during the agent test.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

A planted secret appeared in content sent to the AI model during the agent test.

Impact

The model provider saw the value; it did not leave through the package.

Evidence

./.env (dotenv)

Remediation

Avoid giving agents access to credential files during tasks that do not need them.

References

  • OWASP LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat pack...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "---"; ls ~/.config 2>/dev/null; l...
    • rungrep -ril juicer . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • rungrep -i juicer
    • runenv
  • runbash -c cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat pack...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "---"; ls ~/.config 2>/dev/null; l...
    • rungrep -ril juicer . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat src/index.js
    • runls ~/.config
    • runls ~/.openclaw
    • runwhich juicer npx node
  • runbash -c ls -la ~/.openclaw 2>/dev/null; cat ~/.openclaw/*.json 2>...
    • runls -la ~/.openclaw
    • runhead -50
    • runcat ~/.openclaw/*.json
    • runhead -20
    • runtimeout 20 npx -y @juicer/mcp-server --help
      • runnpx -y @juicer/mcp-server --help
        • runnode /usr/bin/npx -y @juicer/mcp-server --help
          • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
          • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 433 B
          • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 465 B
  • runbash -c timeout 30 npm view @juicer/mcp-server version 2>&1 | hea...
    • runtimeout 30 npm view @juicer/mcp-server version
      • runnpm view @juicer/mcp-server version
        • runnode /usr/bin/npm view @juicer/mcp-server version
          • secretread ~/.npmrc (its own config)
    • runhead -5
  • runbash -c timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http...
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 409 B
    • runtimeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null
      • runcurl -sS -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
        • netregistry.npmjs.org:443 sent 81 B
  • runbash -c timeout 30 curl -sS https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-serv...
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server
      • runcurl -sS https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server
        • netdevelopers.juicer.io:443 sent 93 B
    • runsed s/<[^>]*>/ /g
    • runtr -s \n \n
    • runhead -60
  • runbash -c timeout 30 curl -sS -i https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-s...
    • runhead -40
    • runtimeout 30 curl -sS -i https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server
      • runcurl -sS -i https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server
        • netdevelopers.juicer.io:443 sent 93 B
        • netDNS lookups for juicer.io, npmjs.org 12 queries

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.7s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor check · [date] · last [n] posts per account [Network] Followers Posts/wk Avg eng. Eng/1k You (@[handle]) [n] [n] [n] [n] [Competitor] (@[handle]) ... What
  2. obedient:declared-env ok · 0.6s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor check · [date] · last [n] posts per account [Network] Followers Posts/wk Avg eng. Eng/1k You (@[handle]) [n] [n] [n] [n] [Competitor] (@[handle]) ... What
  3. obedient:ci-github ok · 0.4s

    no new behavior

    $ Competitor check · [date] · last [n] posts per account [Network] Followers Posts/wk Avg eng. Eng/1k You (@[handle]) [n] [n] [n] [n] [Competitor] (@[handle]) ... What
  4. llm:baseline ok · 58.5s

    new behavior: dns:developers.juicer.io, dns:registry.npmjs.org, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 8 model steps, 8 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; env | grep -i juicer $ cat .env; echo "---"; cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat skill/_meta.json $ cat src/index.js; echo "---"; ls ~/.config 2>/dev/null; ls ~/.openclaw 2>/dev/null; which juicer npx node; echo "---"; grep -ril "juicer" . --exclude-dir=.git 2>/dev/null $ ls -la ~/.openclaw 2>/dev/null; cat ~/.openclaw/*.json 2>/dev/null | head -50; echo "---"; timeout 20 npx -y @juicer/mcp-server --help 2>&1 | head -20 $ timeout 30 npm view @juicer/mcp-server version 2>&1 | head -5; echo "---"; timeout 30 npm search juicer 2>&1 | head -10 $ timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://registry.npmjs.org/ 2>&1; timeout 20 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server 2>&1 $ timeout 30 curl -sS https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server 2>&1 | sed 's/<[^>]*>/ /g' | tr -s ' \n' ' \n' | head -60 $ timeout 30 curl -sS -i https://developers.juicer.io/mcp-server 2>&1 | head -40 model said: I'll start by checking the project and whether Juicer is connected.

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.