Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain

Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 1 time, with a normal setup. It contacted mcp.1social.dev. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

2 findings. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
1social
Source
clawhub 1.0.1
SHA-256
aadc6de3ad5f1bfb
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 1 run
  1. Package 1social 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillwhich openclaw hermes claude codexcat ~/.hermes/config.yaml An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network
    • mcp.1social.dev 6 connections, 1.4 KB sent
    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Network destinations contacted

Confidence
Info The package connected to these hosts.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

Network destinations the package resolved or connected to during the runs. All traffic was captured by the sandbox; nothing reached the internet.

Impact

Context only. Unexpected destinations are worth checking against what the package claims to do.

Evidence

mcp.1social.dev

Remediation

Confirm each host is expected (the package's API, its registry). Allowlist expected egress in production.

F02 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cat)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---";...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
    • runwhich openclaw hermes claude codex
    • runcat ~/.hermes/config.yaml
  • runbash -c cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ...
    • runcat .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
    • runsed s/=.*/=<redacted>/
    • runcat skill/_meta.json
    • runcat skill/skill-card.md
  • runbash -c cat src/index.js; echo "---"; git log --oneline -5; echo ...
    • runcat src/index.js
    • rungit log --oneline -5
    • runls ~/.config
    • runls ~
    • runsed s/=.*/=<set>/
    • rungrep -i -E mcp|social
    • runenv
  • runbash -c curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 10 ht...
    • runcurl -s -o /dev/null -w %{http_code}\n
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 81 B
    • runcurl -s --max-time 10 -X POST
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 317 B
    • runhead -30
  • runbash -c curl -s --max-time 10 -X POST https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp...
    • runhead -c 2000 ×2
    • runcurl -s --max-time 10 -X POST
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 224 B
    • runcurl -s --max-time 10 -X POST
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 261 B
  • runbash -c curl -s --max-time 10 -X POST https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp...
    • runcurl -s --max-time 10 -X POST
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 317 B
    • runhead -20 ×2
    • runcurl -s --max-time 10 -X POST
      • netmcp.1social.dev:443 sent 224 B
      • netDNS lookups for 1social.dev 12 queries

Exploration log

1 run
  1. llm:baseline ok · 22.7s

    new behavior: dns:mcp.1social.dev, exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 7 model steps, 6 commands

    $ ls -la; echo "---"; ls -la skill 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; which openclaw hermes claude codex 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; cat ~/.hermes/config.yaml 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; claude mcp list 2>/dev/null; op $ cat README.md; echo "---"; cat package.json; echo "---"; ls -la src; echo "---"; cat .env | sed 's/=.*/=<redacted>/'; echo "---"; cat skill/_meta.json; echo "---"; cat skill/skill-card.md $ cat src/index.js; echo "---"; git log --oneline -5; echo "---"; ls ~/.config 2>/dev/null; ls ~ 2>/dev/null; echo "---"; env | grep -i -E 'mcp|social' | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/' $ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 10 https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp; curl -s --max-time 10 -X POST https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: applicatio $ curl -s --max-time 10 -X POST https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/list","params $ curl -s --max-time 10 -X POST https://mcp.1social.dev/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"initialize","params model said: I checked the environment before doing anything, and I can't carry out the task as asked. Here's what I found and what you need to do. ## What I found - **This project is `payments-api`**, a Node/Express payments service (`src/index.js`, Stripe + Postgres deps). It has nothing to do with social media, and I made no changes to it. - **The 1Social skill is installed** at `./skill` (SKILL.md, skill

llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.