Secrets sent over the network via tcp/443 to registry.npmjs.org
Description
The package transmitted the contents of a credential file to a network destination. Before every run Detonator plants decoy credentials (AWS keys, SSH private key, npm and GitHub tokens, a .env file), each carrying a unique per-run marker. That marker was recovered from outbound traffic captured by the sandbox's network sink, after decoding (base64, hex, URL encoding, chunked DNS labels). This is direct proof that credential material left the process, not an inference from code.
Impact
On a developer workstation or CI runner this hands the operator of the destination host working credentials: registry tokens allow publishing malicious versions of your packages (a worm-style supply chain compromise), cloud keys allow resource abuse and data access, and SSH keys allow lateral movement to every host that trusts them.
Evidence
~/.npmrc (npm) left the sandbox
Remediation
Do not install. If it was installed anywhere, treat every credential readable by that user as compromised: revoke and reissue npm/PyPI/GitHub tokens, rotate cloud keys, replace SSH keys, and review registry publish history and cloud audit logs for the exposure window. Block the destination host at egress and search proxy/DNS logs for other machines that contacted it.
References
- CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information
- ATT&CK T1552.001 Credentials in Files
- ATT&CK T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- OWASP MCP01:2025 Token Mismanagement & Secret Exposure