Detonation LabsBehavioral security for the AI agent supply chain
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Verdict

No malicious behavior observed

We ran it 4 times, with a normal setup, the environment variables it says it needs and RECUED_MCP_TOKEN set. It made no network connections. It did not touch the fake credentials we planted, and nothing it sent carried them.

1 finding. Scanned 27 Oct 2026 by detonator 0.5.1.

Target
recued
Source
clawhub 1.0.0
SHA-256
2917b07486b38dd3
Files
3
RecommendationNo action needed

Nothing observed calls for action. This is evidence, not a guarantee.

batch:clawhub:2026-10-27

What this package does

observed across 4 runs
  1. Package recued 3 files · agent skill
  2. Install No install stepFiles were copied in as they are.
  3. Runs as ls -lals -la skillwhich openclawhead -5 An AI agent also used it 1 time.
  4. What it reached
    Network

    No connections.

    Credentials
    • ./.envread
    Files written

    Nothing outside its own folder.

We planted fake AWS, SSH, npm and GitHub keys and a .env file before every run. Red means something left or was planted to run later.

Findings

F01 Low

Loaded the project's .env file

Confidence
Info The package loaded the project's .env file.
Observed in
llm:baseline

Description

The process loaded the project's .env file. Configuration libraries (python-dotenv, pydantic-settings, the official Python MCP SDK) do this at startup.

Impact

None unless the values leave the process, which would be reported as a critical exfiltration finding.

Evidence

./.env (by cut, grep, sed)

Remediation

No action needed. Keep long-lived secrets out of project .env files where possible.

Process tree

run llm:baseline

Every program that ran, in the order it started, with what each one touched. Red marks the path to a leak or a planted file.

  • runbash -c cd . && echo "--- .env keys (values masked) ---" && sed -...
    • runsed -E s/=(.*)$/=<set, len \1>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcut -d= -f1 .env
      • secretread ./.env
  • runbash -c echo "--- recued refs in project ---"; grep -ril "recued"...
    • rungrep -ril recued . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
View full process tree
  • runbash -c cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && ls -la skill 2>/dev/null ...
    • runls -la
    • runls -la skill
  • runbash -c which openclaw; openclaw --version 2>&1 | head -5; echo "...
    • runwhich openclaw
    • runhead -5
    • runhead -20
  • runbash -c cd . && echo "--- .env keys (values masked) ---" && sed -...
    • runsed -E s/=(.*)$/=<set, len \1>/ .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runcut -d= -f1 .env
      • secretread ./.env
    • runsed -E s/<set, len (.*)>/<set>/
    • runcat README.md
    • runcat package.json
    • runls -la src
  • runbash -c echo "--- probe 7717 ---"; curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null -w ...
    • runcurl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null
    • runhead -20
    • runss -ltnp
    • runls -la ~/.openclaw
    • runhead
  • runbash -c echo "--- recued refs in project ---"; grep -ril "recued"...
    • rungrep -ril recued . --exclude-dir=.git
      • secretread ./.env
    • rungrep -i recued
    • runenv
    • rungrep -i -E openclaw|recued
    • runls /usr/local/bin /usr/bin
    • runcat skill/_meta.json

Exploration log

4 runs
  1. obedient:baseline ok · 0.5s

    no new behavior

    $ RECUED_MCP_TOKEN=<the contract's key> $ openclaw mcp set recued '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:7717/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${RECUED_MCP_TOKEN}"}}'
  2. obedient:declared-env ok · 0.6s

    no new behavior

    $ RECUED_MCP_TOKEN=<the contract's key> $ openclaw mcp set recued '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:7717/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${RECUED_MCP_TOKEN}"}}'
  3. obedient:guided:RECUED_MCP_TOKEN ok · 0.5s

    no new behavior

    $ RECUED_MCP_TOKEN=<the contract's key> $ openclaw mcp set recued '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:7717/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ${RECUED_MCP_TOKEN}"}}'
  4. llm:baseline ok · 11.5s

    new behavior: exec:curl, ownread:./.env · 4 model steps, 5 commands

    $ cd . && ls -la && echo "---" && ls -la skill 2>/dev/null && echo "--- env ---" && [ -n "$RECUED_MCP_TOKEN" ] && echo "RECUED_MCP_TOKEN is set" || echo "RECUED_MCP_TOKEN is NOT set" $ which openclaw; openclaw --version 2>&1 | head -5; echo "--- mcp list ---"; openclaw mcp list 2>&1 | head -20 $ cd . && echo "--- .env keys (values masked) ---" && sed -E 's/=(.*)$/=<set, len \1>/' .env | sed -E 's/<set, len (.*)>/<set>/' && echo "--- raw key names ---" && cut -d= -f1 .env && echo "--- README - $ echo "--- probe 7717 ---"; curl -sS -m 5 -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://127.0.0.1:7717/mcp 2>&1; echo "--- listening ports ---"; (ss -ltnp 2>/dev/null || netstat -ltnp 2>/dev/null) | head -20 $ echo "--- recued refs in project ---"; grep -ril "recued" . --exclude-dir=.git 2>/dev/null; echo "--- token in env ---"; env | grep -i recued || echo "none"; echo "--- openclaw anywhere ---"; ls /usr/ model said: I couldn't do the task — the Recued connection isn't set up in this environment, so there's nothing for me to read or propose changes against. **What I checked:** - `RECUED_MCP_TOKEN` is not set in the environment, and there's no `~/.openclaw/.env` (no `~/.openclaw` directory at all). - The `openclaw` CLI is not installed / not on PATH, so I can't run `openclaw mcp probe recued` or call any `recu

obedient: coverage plateau (2 runs with no new behavior); llm: variants exhausted

Note

Observed behavior only. A clean result does not prove a package is safe. Findings describe what Detonator saw during these runs — not a guarantee about code paths it did not reach.